Strategic Usage in a Multi-Learner Setting

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in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science Major Chair: Sarah Dean* Minor Chair: John Whitman

* coauthor of our work under the same name

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION • SETTING • RESULTS • RELAXATIONS

ONLINE MARKETPLACE SETTING

- Retailers (users) want listings (legitimate or scam) to be successful
- Platforms (services) don't want to host scams/spam (audience trust)

- Platforms want to learn to filter out scam listings
- Retailers want to adapt strategically

[FDA APPROVED] [EPA APPROVED] [GMO FREE] sweatpants [RELIABLE] M. Hardt, N. Megiddo, C. Papadimitriou, and M. Wootters. Strategic classification. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM conference on innovations in theoretical computer science, pages 111–122, 2016.

MOTIVATION

Strategic Classification: single-service setting

- Studied what if retailers adapt through feature manipulation?
- Retailers make listings more believable to trick the platform

MOTIVATION

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M. Hardt, M. Jagadeesan, and C. Mendler-Dünner. Performative Power. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 36, 2022.

Strategic Classification: single-service setting

Performative Power: service's ability to impact the market

- Feature manipulation can be costly!
- In a multi-service setting, retailers might change platforms instead

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Strategic Classification: single-service setting

Performative Power: service's ability to impact the market

This work: multi-service setting

- Retailers only post on a platform if advantageous
- Platforms learn to filter based on their listings

MAIN RESULTS (Informal)

When services retrain naïvely:

• Retailers might avoid suppression by switching platforms endlessly

When services remember past timesteps:

- Services will learn to make accurate assessments
- Scam retailers will leave the market

SETTING

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FORMALIZED SETTING

n users with *d* features $x_i \in \mathscr{X}$ and a label $y_i \in \{-1, 1\}$

m services with classifiers $h_i: \mathscr{X} \to \{\pm 1, -1\}, h \in H$

- Example features: listing descriptions, reviews, number of listings
- Label: "scam" or "legitimate" retailer

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We assume realizability!

Users receive utility from positive classification $u : \mathscr{X} \times H \to \mathbb{R}$

- Assume sign of *u* is shared with *h*
- Example: projected number of clicks on a listing, how strict their filter is

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- Assume sign of *u* is shared with *h*
- Example: projected number of clicks on a listing, how strict their filter is
 - 0-1 utility: $u(x, \theta) = \mathbf{1} \{ \theta^{\mathrm{T}} \varphi(x) > 0 \}$
 - Linear utility: $u(x, \theta) = \theta^{T} \varphi(x)$

Users receive utility from positive classification $u : \mathscr{X} \times H \to \mathbb{R}$

- Assume sign of *u* is shared with *h*
- Users assign usage *A* to services that give them utility: This incurs cost! $1/q (\sum_{j}^{m} A_{ij})^{q}$ Example: effort to join a platform

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- Assume sign of *u* is shared with *h*
- Users assign usage *A* to services that give them utility: This incurs cost! $1/q (\sum_{j}^{m} A_{ij})^{q}$

Users allocate usage to maximize:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{m} A_{ij} u(x_i, h_j) - \frac{1}{q} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{m} A_{ij}\right)^q$$

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- Lemma 8: users choose services with maximum utility
 - Proof concept: the only stable equilibrium point when taking gradient descent on the user objective is when all weight is in services granting maximum utility
- **Corollary 9:** services that give no utility to a user will receive no usage

Services observe user usages to learn about the user distribution

$$M^{t} = \frac{A^{t}}{1+p} + \frac{pM^{t-1}}{1+p}$$

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Services optimize over non-negative loss $\ell: H \times \mathscr{X} \times \mathscr{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$

- Utility has a strict monotonic relationship with $-y\ell(h, x, y)$
- There exists a v > 0 such that u(x, h) = 0 when $\ell(h, x, y) = v$

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 - 0-1 loss: $\ell(\theta, x, y) = \mathbf{1} \{ \theta^{\mathrm{T}} \varphi(x) \cdot y > 0 \}$
 - Hinge loss: $\ell(\theta, x, y) = \max\{1 \theta^{T}\varphi(x) \cdot y, 0\}$

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$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{M_{ij}^{t}}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} M_{kj}^{t}} \ell(h_j, x_i, y_i)$$

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- Lemma 2: services have zero loss for users they've seen
 - Proof concept: if we saw the point before, realizability gives that the objective wouldn't be minimized if it wasn't classified correctly

FULL INTERACTION DYNAMICS

At timestep *t*: $A^{t} \in \operatorname*{argmax}_{A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}_{+}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \sum_{j=1}^{m} A_{ij} u(x_{i}, h_{j}^{t}) - \frac{1}{q} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{m} A_{ij} \right]^{q} \right|$ $M^{t} = \frac{A^{t}}{1+p} + \frac{pM^{t-1}}{1+p}$ $H^{t+1} \in \operatorname*{argmin}_{H \in \mathcal{H}^m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{M_{ij}^{t}}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} M_{kj}^{t}} \ell(h_j, x_i, y_i)^{*}$

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* (tiebreaking must be sticky!)

RESULTS

INTRODUCTION • SETTING • RESULTS • RELAXATIONS

ZERO-LOSS STATE

Definition 2. A state (*H*,*A*) is **zero-loss** if all services *j* satisfy:

1.
$$A_{ij}\ell(h_j, x_i, y_i) = 0$$
 for all $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$
2. $u(x_i, h_j) \le 0$ for all i with $y_i = -1$.

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All services make accurate classifications on the populations they observe

ZERO-LOSS STATE


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
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
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
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
All negative users receive zero utility and will not use any service



























Without memory, negative users (orange and red) switch between services endlessly!



CONVERGENCE RESULT

Definition 2. A state (*H*,*A*) is **zero-loss** if all services *j* satisfy:

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 for all $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$
2. $u(x_i, h_j) \le 0$ for all i with $y_i = -1$.

Theorem 6. Given nonzero memory p > 0, there is a finite time $t \in \mathbb{N}$ after which for all $\tau > t$, (H^{τ}, A^{τ}) is zero-loss.

PROOF STRUCTURE

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- **Proposition 3:** once reached, future timesteps will be zero-loss states
 - Proof concept: no mistakes means no service update; users are in an equivalence class and are would've incurred loss before if possible

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- Lemma 5: no services observing new users implies a zero-loss state
 - Proof concept: services already do well on users they saw

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- Lemma 5: no services observing new users implies a zero-loss state
 - Proof concept: services already do well on users they saw
- **Theorem 6:** zero-loss state occurs in finite time
 - Proof concept: there are only *nm* new users that can be introduced to services

BANKNOTE FORGERY EXPERIMENT

Depositors (users) want to deposit banknotes

• Some depositors are forgers!


Banks (services) don't want to accept forgeries

• Want to learn classifiers to vet banknotes


Positives: legal banknotes

Negatives: forgeries


BANKNOTE FORGERY EXPERIMENT



BANKNOTE FORGERY ABLATION (m)



BANKNOTE FORGERY ABLATION (s)



BANK ACCOUNT FRAUD EXPERIMENT

Clients (users) want to open bank accounts

• Some of these clients and openings are fraudulent


Banks (services) don't want to accept these clients

• Want to learn classifiers to vet bank account openings

Positives: legal banknotes

Negatives: fraudulent openings

BANK ACCOUNT FRAUD EXPERIMENT



RELAXATIONS

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ROUND ROBIN UPDATES

Usage reallocation and service retraining isn't so synchronous in real life!

• What if users and services update fully at random?

Need a new time concept: rounds

ROUND ROBIN UPDATES

Usage reallocation and service retraining isn't so synchronous in real life!

• What if users and services update fully at random?

Need a new time concept: rounds

- Generalize timesteps to contain a full set of user updates and service updates
- **Proposition 7.** Given nonzero memory p > 0, there are a finite number of rounds $r \in \mathbb{N}$ after which for all $\rho > r$, (H^{ρ}, A^{ρ}) is zero-loss.

Many interesting extensions involve removing the realizability guarantee

- Users not revealing labels
- Stochastic user labels
- Noisy observations

Inherently violates the existence of a zero-loss equilibrium!

Many interesting extensions involve removing the realizability guarantee

Definition 3. A state (H^{τ}, A^{τ}) is a **stable state** if for all $H > \tau, H^{t} = H^{\tau}$.

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
Definition 3. A state (H^{τ}, A^{τ}) is a **stable state** if for all $H > \tau$, $H^{t} = H^{\tau}$.

Memory update
$$M^{t} = \frac{A^{t}}{1+p} + \frac{pM^{t-1}}{1+p}$$

MEMORY


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Service update
$$H^{t+1} \in \underset{H \in \mathcal{H}^m}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{M_{ij}^t}{\sum_{k=1}^n M_{kj}^t} \ell(h_j, x_i, y_i)$$

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
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
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Even so, we cannot make any guarantees for this new convergence definition!


0-1 Memory:

$$M^{t} = \begin{cases} A^{t} & \text{if } p = 0\\ \mathbf{1} \left\{ \max(A^{t}, M^{t-1}) \right\} & \text{if } p > 0 \end{cases}$$

Memoryless

Weighted Memory

0-1 Memory



SAMPLED USERS

Users might enter or leave a system over time, leading to a non-static dataset

This means there's no longer a finite number of service-user introductions!

A mistake bound analysis is required!

SAMPLED USERS


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A mistake bound analysis is required!

• Even so, could make an infinite number of mistakes with no further constraints on the model class

SAMPLED USERS



FUTURE DIRECTIONS

• Further theoretical exploration of the relaxations!

Extensions:

- Explicit competition between services
- Long-term strategic planning of users

THANK YOU!

ADVISORS • FRIENDS • COWORKERS • FAMILY