


Strategic Usage in a Multi-Learner Setting

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Motivating Example

Retailers (**users**) choose between online marketplace platforms (**services**) for posting their listings. While most retailers are **legitimate**, some are **scammers** who post scam listings to deceive customers. Platforms want to incentivize retailers to use their services for posting listings, but allowing scams to proliferate decreases audience trust, and is generally undesirable. To this end, platforms want to **learn algorithms to filter** scam retailers; however, this forces retailers to **adapt strategically** to stay out of the filter.

Related Work

Strategic Classification

- Hardt et al. (2016): **single-service setting**
- Users engaged in strategic **feature manipulation** to adapt to the service (retailers make their listings more believable).
- As the classifiers shift, even certain legitimate retailers would start to be filtered out, forcing them to begin acting strategically as well just to maintain their ability to post listings.

Performative Prediction

- Hardt et al. (2022): feature manipulation could often be prohibitively costly.
- In **multi-service settings**, scam retailers are more likely to **switch services** instead of trying to convince the platform they were previously with.

Our Contributions

- We **formalize** the game of **strategic usage**, where users only use services that are advantageous to them.
- Services only observe the users using them; online marketplaces only observe the listings on their own platform.
- **Naïve retraining** allows undesirable users to perpetually game the system by **oscillating** between services.
- When services incorporate **past observations** they reach a **convergent state** with desirable conditions in a **finite time**.
- This status quo would be the starting point from which a feature manipulation game would be incentivized to begin.

Formalized Setting

- **Binary classification** problem, modeling $n \in \mathbb{N}_+$ **users** each with d features $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ and a label $y_i \in \{+1, -1\}$.
- Features are things usable for classifying each user: listing descriptions, reviews, number of listings, etc.
- They use $m \in \mathbb{N}_+$ **services** which each put out **classifiers** $h_j^t : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{+1, -1\}, h \in \mathcal{H}$ at every timestep t to classify the users.

User Game

- Services give utility to users proportional to their classification, as controlled by **utility function** $u : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{H} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.
- Utility shares sign with h , meaning that users receive utility from positive classifications.
- Users then assign **usage** A to services that give the most utility, optimizing:

$$\max \sum_{j=1}^m A_{ij} u(x_i, h_j^t) - \frac{1}{q} (\sum_{j=1}^m A_{ij})^q \quad (1)$$
- Usage cost can be interpreted as the effort to join a platform, or to create listings.

Service Game


- Usages are observed to update the service's understanding of the user distribution, controlled by **memory** parameter p .

$$M^t = \frac{A^t}{1+p} + \frac{pM^{t-1}}{1+p} \quad (2)$$
- Services then minimize non-negative **loss** $\ell : \mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ over this distribution.
- We assume that increasing utility to positive users will decrease loss, while increasing utility to negative users incurs loss.
- Service objective is a weighted loss:

$$\min \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{M_{ij}^t}{\sum_{k=1}^m M_{kj}^t} \ell(h_j, x_i, y_i) \quad (3)$$

Full Interaction Dynamics

- We assume **joint updates** due to the independence of usage updates between users and classifier updates between services.
- Users can tiebreak optimal usages however they choose; however, we constrain service tiebreaking to abiding by a **sticky property**.
- If a classifier h_j^t is optimal at timestep t and $t + 1$, the service will re-use the classifier from the previous timestep.



Theoretical Results

Definition 2. A state (H, A) is **zero-loss** if all services j satisfy:

1. $A_{ij} \ell(h_j, x_i, y_i) = 0$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$
2. $u(x_i, h_j) \leq 0$ for all i with $y_i = -1$

Proposition 1. In the memoryless $p = 0$ setting, there exist settings in which the state (H, A) never converges.

Proposition 3. If a state (H^t, A^t) zero-loss at time t , then all future states are zero-loss for all times $\tau \geq t$.

Lemma 4. For any timestep t if there exists no values $M_{ij}^{t-1} = 0$ such that $A_{ij}^t > 0$, then (H^t, A^t) is zero-loss.

Theorem 5. Given nonzero memory $p > 0$, there is a finite time $t \in \mathbb{N}_+$ after which for all $\tau > t$, (H^τ, A^τ) is zero-loss.

Banknote Experiment

We use the Banknote Authentication dataset (Lohweg, 2013) to experimentally verify our theoretical results. **Legal** banknotes serve as positive users and **forgeries** as negative users, with banks being modeled as services trying to avoid forgeries. In the memoryless setting, oscillation can be observed and negative users never leave the system; however, when $p > 0$ we observe a convergent state after the fourth epoch.

References

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